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A major issue in the study of American politics is the extent to which electoral discipline
also constrains bureaucrats. Inpractice. executive agencies operate with considerable independence from elected of cials. However, the entire process of policy execution is a game among
legislators. the chief executive. and bureaucratic agents. It includes the initial delegation of authority. the choice of policy alternatives, and opportunities for oversight and control. A simple
model of this process demonstrates an important distinction between bureaucratic authority
and bureaucratic discretion. Indeed. in its simplest form, the model predicts a world in which
bureaucrats are the sole active participants in policyrnaking, but in which the choice of policy

is traceable entirely to the preferences of elected of cials. More realistically. the model leads
to a precise de nition of agency discretion. These conclusions have practical applications for
both students and reformers of policymalting.

Democratic constitutions attempt to constrain policymakers with the
discipline of the electoral process. By mandating frequent elections, the
U.S. Constitution gives representatives (in the words of The Federalist, no.
52} “an immediate dependence on, and an intimate sympathy with, the people” (Hamilton, Jay, and Madison, 1966, p. 165). Modern researchhas conrmed the success of this mechanism, mediated though it is by the dynamics
of interest group organization (Mayhew, 1974; Fenno, 1978). Policy decisions, however, are no longer the exclusive domain of elected representatives. A major unresolved issue in the study of American politics is the extent to whichtheconstitutional system of safeguards and incentives designed
to discipline elected representatives also works to discipline bureaucrats.
According to one view, the bureaucracy operates with considerable independence from elected representatives. Legislators are unable or unwilling to perform meaningful oversight (Nisltanen, 1971; Dodd and Schott,
1929, pp. 170-84; Katzmann, 1980, pp. 140-60), and the president, although perhaps effective on a few selected issues, faces severe constraints
of power and resources in controlling his nominal subordinates (Neustadt,
1980; Allison ,1921, pp. 141-42,225-26). On the other hand,a host of stud‘An earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the American
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ies argue that the decisions of federal agencies directly reflect the wishes of
elected of cials in Congress and the White House (Mayhew, 1974, pp. 10640; Arnold, 1979, pp. 207-10; Fiorina, 1981; Moe, 1985; Calvert, Moran,
and Weingast, 1988). In this view, elected of cials gain leverage over bureaucrats through informal oversight, using such tools as decentralized information gathering (McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984; Weingast, 1984; Aberbach, 198?) and carefully structured administrative procedures
(McCubbins, 1985; McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast, 1987) to guarantee
that the relevant legislative constituents are well served.
We address this unresolved issue with a simple model of the policy process. Implicit inthe structure of decision making created by the Constitution
is a game that pits the ambitions of institutional actors against one another.
In particular, the process of policy execution is a game among legislators,
the chief executive, andbureaucratic agents; it includesthe initialdelegation
of authority, the choice of policy alternatives, and opportunities for oversight and control. The actions of political of cials throughout this process
jointly determine policy outcomes. Our aim is to examine the sequence of
decisions made by elected representatives and bureaucrats, to explore the
strategies available to them, and to assess the policy outcomes that result.
As our analysis demonstrates, the fact that bureaucratic agents appear
to make policy with little direct input from elected officials does not necessarily imply that bureaucrats are responsible for policy choices or that they
employ meaningful “discretion.” Bureaucratic choice is embedded in a
game in which the appointment power of the executive and legislature, together with the threat of sanctions, provides a potentially decisive in uence
over policy. In its simple form, this games equilibrium has two important
properties. First, bureaucrats are the sole active participants in policymaking. Second, however. the actual choice of policy is traceable not to bureaucratic preferences but to the preferences of legislative and executive poli-

ticians.

This approach also leads us to a precise de nition of agency discretion.
The simple game whose outcome we have just described is relevant when
politicians possess suf cient information about the preferences and beliefs
of appointees, or suf cient willingness to oversee agency decision making.
When the information is poor and the willingness is lacking, there is room
for agency discretion. Discretion consists of the departure of agency decisions from the positions agreed upon by the executive and legislature at the
time of delegation and appointment. Thus even though the agency may be
the sole active decision maker, policy outcomes are traceable to the preferences of all three institutions and to the constitutional process in which
they act.
A further implication of this approach is the following comparative statics result: allelse equal, the more important a policy area to politicians, the
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lower the amount of agency discretion. This follows because in those areas
in which they care the most, politicians will expend greater effort and resources in reducing the uncertainty that affords bureaucrats the opportunity
for discretion.
Beyond these theoretical issues in democratic politics,our study has two
important practical applications. First, any attempt to improve policy outcomes systematically through structural or procedural reform depends on
a sophisticated understanding of where the relevant policy decisions are
made. If,for example, the legislature is primarily responsible for the content
of policy outcomes, then no amount of reform of the bureaucratic process
is going to make much difference, and “improvements" in the oversight capabilities of the legislature will just enhance existing tendencies.
Second, empirical analysis of the policymakingprocess, particularly using the case study approach, can be seriously misdirected if the analyst does
not have the proper understanding of the nature of responsibility for policy
outcomes. Instudying policymakingit isnatural to focus on the units making
the actual decisions. However, concentrating on acts of decision making
rather than on in uences over decision making is a kind of myopia that can
lead to false conclusions about where the responsibility for policies lies.1
We proceed as follows. The rst section presents a stylized model of the
process of policymaking. It includes an initial stage wherein elected officials
choose an appointee; a choice stage in which the appointee, as bureaucratic
agent, determines a policy choice; and a nal stage in which the legislature
and executive react to the decisions of the agent. Using this simple model,
we exhibit the nature of equilibrium behavior by all the participants in the
process and analyze their contributions to the policy choice. The second sectionrelaxes the basic model’s assumption of perfect information to get a useful characterization of agency discretion. The third section explores some
variants on the legislative and executive powers in the basic model in order
to underscore the generality of the basic model’s conclusions. The nal section offers prescriptions and cautions for empirical analysts of the process.
A Simple Model of the Policy Procws

The model in this section focuses on the essential features of the policymaking process in order to draw conclusions about how its outcomes are
determined. Although the real world is considerably more complicated
than, and in some respects just plain different from, the basic model, many
of the same general conclusions ought to hold. In particular, well-chosen
agents, in an agency constructed to channel their incentives correctly, can
‘Some examples of the ambiguities of such an approach are explored in Calvert, Moran,
and Weingast (1938).
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potential agents havingideal points everywhere in the relevant policy space.
Suppose that each actor has strictly convex preferences over the entire policy space. Given the perfect-information environment of our simple model,
we lose no generality by assuming from the outset that x,,, as well as the ultimate policy choice of the agent, will lie on the contract curve of the legislature and executive, that is, on the locus of tangency points of their indifference curves. Thus we may as well assume that therelevant policy space
is the real line, R, with I;= 0 and x,. = 1.3 The legislature and executive are
to determine, in a manner to be described below, a value for x,,; then an
agent is to choose a policy 1:. This choice is then subject to veto by either
the executive or the legislature.
Now let us simplify further by assuming that the actors’ utility functions
on this unidimensional policy space take the following form: for the agent,
u,,{x] = v,,

- Ix — x,,I;

for the executive,
u,.(x] = v, - E1 - xi;

and for the legislature,
ugixl

=12;

- lxl.

If no agent is agreed upon by the legislature and executive, or if the agent’s
choice is vetoed by either elected of cial, then all three players receive a
payoff of zero. The higher the values of v,,, v,, and IQ‘, the greater departure
from the ideal that each actor is willing to accept inorder to get some agency
decision implemented rather than none.
The stages in our game are as follows; each stage is justified and analyzed below. First, the legislature and executive determine the agent’s preferences in a Nash bargaining process (Nash, 1950). The threat point for this
process is the “no decision" outcome. Second, the chosen agent picks a policy x. Third, the legislature and executive decide simultaneously whether to
exercise their veto powers. Then the players receive their payoffs, and the
game ends. For reasons that will be apparent, we take up these stages in re-

verse order.

The Veto Stage
The veto stage represents the ability of a real world legislature or executive to prevent an agency’s decision from taking effect, but only at the
’Whatever the bargaining process, there is no reason for the executive and legislature to
settle on an agent ideal point off their contract curve. since they could both be made better
they should never agree on a
off by locating at some point on the contract curve.
point on the curve but beyond the segment between their ideal points.
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be left alone to determine the policy that the elected of cials would themselveshave chosen, given the time and resources. Failing this, the possibility
of retribution or circumvention after the fact may still limit the extent to
which an agent is willing to exercise the discretion available.
The general structure of our basic modelis as follows. We assume that
two elected of cials (a legislature and an executive) share the power to appoint an agent. The agent will then choose a policy alternative. These three
actors have different preferences about what the policy should be; however,
the legislature and executive can choose their agent’s preferences by choosing a mutually agreeable individual from a pool of available candidates. Initially, we assume that the actors have complete informationabout all aspects
of the process, so that the elected of cials know exactly what they are getting
when they make the appointment. For simplicity, we treat all three actors
as individual decision makers in order to focus our analysis on the basic
process?
In addition to their preferences over policy outcomes, all three actors
attach some independent value to reaching some policy decision as opposed
to deadlock. After the agent chooses a policy, both the legislature and the
executive have the power unilaterally to void that decision through some
sort of veto. In that case the outcome is equivalent to a deadlock over the

original appointment.
In this section we rst set up and solve the basic model. We then examine its properties and describe the roles of the players in determining policy. Then in the next section we shall turn to the effect of adding uncertainty
to the basic model.
The Basic Mode!
Let x; be the ideal point of the legislature in a set of policy alternatives
that is a convex subset of some (multidimensional) Euclidean space. Let x,
be the ideal of the executive, and x, that of the chosen agent. Throughout
the paper we assume that the nominations are drawn from a large pool of

"This approach assumes away two potentially important aspects of the policy process.
First, there are problems of organizational monitoring and compliance as the appointed agent
attempts to control the bureaucracy. The effect of adding this feature to the model is akin to
the effect of adding monitoring problems to the veto stage of the basic model, as discussed below in the text. Second, there are problems of the instability of social choice within the organizations that, in the real world, make up all three of our “players." Hill (1985) and Hammond.
Hill. and Miller (1986) point out that, in principle, the agent couldtake advantage of majority
rule cycles within the legislature to avoid any legislative control.The same reasoningmight be
applied in reverse: social choice in a bureaucratic organization is in theory no betterbehaved
than in the legislature. We suspect that such problems are overcome through structural constraints and repeated interaction within each type of organization, and so we are willing to lgnore them for the time being.
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potential agents having ideal points everywhere in the relevant policy space.
Suppose that each actor has strictly convex preferences over the entire policy space. Given the perfect-information environment of our simple model,
we lose no generality by assuming from the outset that x,,, as well as the ultimate policy choice of the agent, will lie on the contract curve of the legislature and executive, that is, on the locus of tangency points of their indifference curves. Thus we may as well assume that the relevant policy space
is the real line,R,with xg = 0 and x, = 1.3 The legislature and executive are
to determine, in a manner to be described below, a value for x,; then an
agent is to choose a policy x. This choice is then subject to veto by either
the executive or the legislature.
Now let us simplify further by assuming that the actors’ utility functions
on this unidimensional policy space take the following form: for the agent,
u,,{x] = v,

- lx — xal;

for the executive,
tt,{x] = v,

—

I1

- xl;

and for the legislature,

utixl =v;= —

lxl.

If no agent is agreed upon by the legislature and executive, or if the agent’s
choice is vetoed by either elected official, then all three players receive a
payoff of zero. The higher the values of v,.,, v,, and v,;, the greater departure
from the idealthat each actor is willing to accept in order to get some agency
decision implemented rather than none.
The stages in our game are as follows; each stage is justi ed and analyzed below. First, the legislature and executive determine the agent’s preferences in a Nash bargaining process (Nash. 1950). The threat point for this
process isthe “no decision” outcome. Second, the chosen agent picks a policy 1:. Third, the legislature and executive decide simultaneously whether to
exercise their veto powers. Then the players receive their payoffs, and the
game ends. For reasons that will be apparent, we take up these stages in reverse order.
The Veto Stage
The veto stage represents the ability of a real world legislature or executive to prevent an agency’s decision from taking effect, but only at the
’Whatever the bargaining process. there is no reason for the executive and legislature to
settle on an agent ideal point off their contract curve, since they could both be made better
off by locating at some point on the contract curve. Likewise. they should never agree on a
point on the curve but beyond the segment between their ideal points.
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cost of delaying any action or of having to spend time and resources to make
the decision without an agency’s assistance. Such powers may take various
forms, such as a genuine veto, budgetary retaliation, direct legislative action
to make policy, or ring of an agency head bythe executive. In section 3
we examine more closely some alternative models of this veto power, but
we can make our point here while keeping it simple.
Since there is no independent cost to exercising the veto, we can examine the legislature’s and executive’s decisions separately. The executive
should veto if the outcome x is worse than “no decision,” that is, if
u,{x) < 0. For x in the unit interval, this means the executive vetoes
if x < 1 v,. Likewise, the legislature vetoes if light} < 0, or for x in

-

[0, 11,1 > Vf.

The Policy Decision Stage

-

We now back up to the choice to be made by the agent. If 1
v, > v;,thenthe agent cannot possibly please bothmasters, and veto isinevitable. Otherwise, if the agent is to avoid being vetoed, it must choose it from
the interval [1 - v,, Vt]. Ifthe distance from x,, to this interval is more than
v,,, then the agent prefers to be vetoed anyway, and we may as well assume
that the agent's choice is = x,. On the other hand, if x, is in the interval
[1 — v, -— v,,, vg + v,,], thenthe agent wishes to avoidthe veto. Ifx, is actually
in [1 -— 12,, 93}, the agent simply choosesx =x,,. Otherwise, the agent chooses
the nearest point to x,, that will not be vetoed. To summarize,
'

x,, (vetoed)
1-v,
x,,
v,
x, (vetoed)

if x, <: 1 v, — va;
ifl-v,.-v_,=Ex,,<I-v,;
if1—v, x, 5 vg;
if v; < x,, 5 vg+v,,; and
if v; + v, < x,.

These choices are illustrated in Figure 1.4
The Appointment Stage

Finally, we arrive at the rst stage of the game, in which the legislature
and executive engage in a Nash bargaining game over the type of agent to
appoint.5 Their payoffs from appointing an agent with ideal point x, are the
payoffs they would receive from the policy process given the optimal behavior of an agent with that ideal point in the policy decision stage, and given
their own subsequent optimal behavior in the veto stage. The “threat
point," the payoff from failing to reach any agreement on the appointment,
‘We have modeled this as a one-shot affair, but similar results can be obtained from a
repeated-game version. See Appendix A.
‘For a justification of this approach. see Appendix B.
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FIGURE 1

Policy Choice, x, as a Function of Agent’s Ideal Point,x,
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is zero for each player. The “negotiation set,” that is, the set of agent ideal
points that are Pareto optimal for the legislature and executive and make
both of them better off than the threat point, is the interval [max {(1, 1
v,},min{1, v,e_}]. Ofcourse,if 1— v,, > vhthennomutuallypro tabie agree-

-

is possible.
The Nash bargaining solution (NBS) requires that the product of the
two players’ utility gain over their threat point be maximized.Thusthe NBS
occurs when the executive nominates, and the legislature accepts, an agent
with ideal point the value of that maximizes tvg - Ix,|) (v, I1 - x,|]
(V5 + 1— v,J/2 providover all values of x, in the negotiation set. Thus
ed that this value lies in the unit interval; if the value islessthan 0, set = 0;
if it is greater than 1, set = 1.
ment

x;,

x;

x;

x;
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The Roles of the Players in Deterrnining Policy
Under the assumptions of the basic model, then, we can predict the ultimate policy decision, given the preferences of the executive and the legislature. Since it:is in the interval [1 - 12,, 1/{L the appointed agent will have
ideal point x, = Jr; and will choose .1:
as the policy; it will not be vetoed.
Thus the ultimate policy decision is determined by x = [vg + 1 12,112. In the basic model, although policy decisions are made by an agent,
they are really determined by the preferences of the elected of cials.
In a comparative statics sense, any shift in v, or P; has a straightforward
effect on x: for a unit increase in v; or a unit decrease in v,, there will be
a 1.'2—unit increase in the nal location of x. More generally, in a multidimensional policy space, any shift in the executive's or legislature’s ideal
point means a corresponding shift in the location of their contract curve, and
thus in the appointed agent’s ideal and the policy outcome.
Thus in the basic model, the legislature and executive have complete
control over the policy outcome through their bargaining process in appointing the agent. Active monitoring andcontrol of the agency’s decisions plays
no role. Of course, there is more to the real world process of policymaking
than this; in particular, the players’ uncertainty at every stage of the process
is a key feature, to which we turn in the next section. But in all our subsequent development of the model, the appointment stage remains as the initial control over agency decisions, and policy outcomes continue to re ect
the bargain struck between the two elective branches of government.

x:

Uncertainty and Agency Discretion
The conclusions of the basic model result directly from the assumption
that the executive and legislature have perfect information. Imperfect information could arise at many points in the process. The elected authorities
might not know exactly the true preferences of the agent. Indeed, policymaking by an agency often starts with the gathering of information about
the policy problem to be addressed, information presumably not known to
the elected authorities at the time of the appointment. It may not even be
clear in advance what the ultimate policy alternatives will be. In a broader
conception of the model, an agent may face a stream of policy problems over
time, among which only the earliest, if any, can be accurately anticipated
by the appointing players. Any slippage between the expectations of the appointers and the preferences of the appointee creates the possibility that the
agent’s preferences will have an independent effect on the ultimate policy

choice.
In this section we examine sortie of these sources of uncertainty in the
context of the basic model developed in section 1. The model becomes in-
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tractable when uncertainty is included, but we can interrogate the basic
model to learn the effects of uncertainty on policy choice. In doingso, more
detail emerges concerning the sources of policy choice. Inparticular, we are
able to give a formal de nition of agency discretion and distinguish it from
agency choice.

Uncertainty about Agent Preferences
Suppose that, for any of the reasons cited above, the executive and legislature are unable to observe the true ideal point x,, of any potential agent
:1. Instead, the true 1:, consists of the elected officials‘ intended or expected
value, plus some (apparently random) deviation 8 whose expected value
is zero. Here, we return to the multidimensional formulation of the model,
so both and 8 are vectors in R”.
Suppose momentarily that the possible values of 8 are restricted so that,
with probability 1, the true x, lies between the executive’s and legislature’s
ideal points and would not be vetoed by either elected official if it were chosen by the agent as the nal policy. Then, using the same reasoning as in
section 1, the agent would make that choice. Given the linear utility functions we assumed earlier, both the executive and legislature thus have, in
the appointment stage,

x;,
x;

Euglx I x;}=£u,{x;+s]=£u,{x;}=u,u;J.

Thus the Nash bargaining process would have the same outcome as before.
The difference would appear only at the policy choice stage, when the
agent's true preference is revealed.
Unfortunately, this simplifying assumption, the restriction of 8, is not
very appealing. The restriction depends on the values v, and vg, so comparative statics on those two parameters are not possible without further restrictive assumptions. If instead we let 5 range freely, the bargaining outcome
may be affected.‘ The bargainingmodelbecomes intractable,and we cannot
derive an easy formula for comparative statics as in the basic model. Fortunately, however, we can still learn much about the process simply by examining the effect of deviations, 8, from the expected policy in the basic
model.

E ects of Uncertainty
We return now to the basic model, but ignore the particular derivation

of

x;, and add the assumption that x, = x; + 5. Within the interval

"The reason for this is as follows. There is a positive probability that the true x. would lie
outside the no-veto region, in which case the agent would either choose 9* x. to avoid the
veto, or choose .1: -= x. and be vetoed, resulting in a payoff of zero to all players. Either way.
J: is no longer a linear function ofx;, so Euglx Ixzl 9‘ Eu,-(.x;] and the expected payoff from uppointingan agent with expected idealxjis different from the payoffofdoingsoundercenainty.
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[1 — v,, v;], where no decision is vetoed, every change in x, means a corresponding change in the ultimate policy choice x. This interval is the area
of agency discretion. Just outside the interval, but within v, of its endpoints,
small changes inx, make no difference ,as the agent chooses the nearest endpoint to avoid a veto. This is the area of latentpoliticalcontrol. Further than
that from the no-veto interval, the agent would rather be vetoed than implement a repugnant policy, and the result is just that. This is the area of
active political control. Finally, changes in v,, alter the range in which latent
control occurs, and changes in v, and 19¢ alter all three areas. Of course, in
our original, multidimensional policy space formulation, it would also be
possible for x,, to lie off the contract curve of the executive and legislature.
A similar analysis applies in that case. The area for agency discretion would
be narrowed the further x, lies off the contract curve. The general case is
illustrated in Figure 2.

FIGURE 2

Areas of Agency Discretion, LatentPolitical Control, and Active Political
Control as a Function of x. inthe Multidimensional Model

Latent Political Control

Active

Political
Control
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Agency Discretion and the Sources of Policy

This simple analysis offers some conclusions about who is responsible
for policy outcomes. Suppose that x,, is in the no-veto interval; then the policy outcome is = x,,. Certainly this differs from both the legislature’s and
the executive‘s ideals; for at least one of them, it is worse than
Suppose
for example that 5 > O. The observer of the policy process would see the
agent make a decision consistent with agent preferences, while the legislator
complains about the difference between it and xg. Even the executive (who
probably does not complain) realizes a policy choice that differs from x,_.. Is
it reasonable, then, to conclude that the agent is “responsible for" or “controls” policy, or that the elected officials have been disfranchised? As our
model makes clear, the answer is no: agency discretion only allowed the
agent to implement the difference 8, while the base from which the agent
departed, x,,, was chosen by the elected officials. If the legislature or executive had had different preferences, the policy outcome would have been
different.
lfx.lies outside but near the no-veto interval, appearances can be even
more deceiving. The agent unilaterally chooses a policy different from that
expected by the executive and legislature, and as different from one of them
as the agent can possibly get away with. That choice is tempered, however,
not only by the original
intended by the appointment, but also by the
agent"s anticipation of a utility-reducing veto if x x,, were chosen. Here
again, although the agency makes the actual decision, and decides partly in
line with its own preferences, the policy outcome is attributable in part to
political control. This control is prospective, exercised through the appointment process and through latent oversight. Only if the agent’s ideal lies far
from the no-veto interval does the observer of the policy choice see any active political control; the result is undesired delay and unanticipated extra
work for the executive and legislature. The better the information in the
hands of the elected officials, the rarer the latter outcome will be.
In any of the cases in which the agency is not vetoed, we can de ne
agency discretion as a component of the chosen policy. The most important
point of this modelisthat agency discretiondoes not consist of the difference
between the agency’s choice and the leg:islature’s wishes, or between the
agency’s choice and the executive's wishes. Much less does it lie in the fact
that the agency makes the actual policy choice, or that the elected of cials
exercise no active oversight of the choice. Rather, agency discretion is the
difference, it —between the agency’s choice and the choice the elected
officials thought they were getting when they agreed on a nominee. Any
other difference from either elected of cial’s wishes isattributable to the ap-

x;.

x;

x;,
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pointment process, not to the agency. To put this another way, the appointment process is a component of the agency’s nal decision. It is, just as in
the basic model, the initial tool of the elected officials in determiningpolicy.
Thus the structure of the policy game establishes incentives and constraints that discipline bureaucratic choice. The agent’s goals are predetermined, subject to error, by elected of cials. Anticipation by the agent of legislative or executive reaction is sometimes sufficient to bring its policy
choices further into line with the elected of cial’s original expectations. If
the error in the appointment stage is not too large, then, direct or active intervention by those of cials wouldberedundant. As a result of these factors,
a process that seems on the surface to exhibit wide agency discretion can
conceal even heavy in uence by elected officials. The bureaucracy is subject, indirectly, to the discipline of elections.
Uncertainty about Agency Choices: The Monitoring Problem
Uncertainty at the veto stage of our policy process can also give rise to
agency discretion. Suppose that the potential vetoer of the agency’s choice
does not know with certainty the precise location of that choice. This is the
standard monitoringproblem from agency theory. Such uncertainty could
in principle arise either from lack of information about the details of agency
actions or lack of understanding about the implications of agency actions for
ultimate policy outcomes. This might make it possible for the agency to conceal the true implications of its choices from the elected of cials at least for
a time. Agency discretion would then consist of the departure of the true
policy .1: from the appointed and would be limited by the possibility of a
veto based on an estimated policy I’ derived from any partial information
about agency actions.
The monitoring problem occurs only when the agency has information
not possessed by any politically relevant actor displeased by the agency's
choice. If the preferences of elected officials are derived from the interests
of constituents, and if agency decisions are a matter of public record, then
such a pattern of expertise and preferences should be rare. Inthe U.S. context, for example, organized interest groups typically do have the relevant
technical information; as a last resort, if adversely affected by an agency
choice, such groups can inform elected of cials and encourage them to take
remedial action (McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984). Further, administrative
procedures are typically designed to force maximum revelation of the information and actions of an agency (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast, 1987).
Thus agency discretion in the federal government does not often result simply from ignorance on the part of elected officials, unlessthe political stakes
of the agency’s policies are low.

x;
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Other Executive and Legislative Powers

Our model portraysthe legislature as having a simple ex post veto power
over agency decisions. More commonly, real world legislatures wield less
direct controls over agency actions. Most important of these are the legislature‘s control over program authorizations and appropriations that enable
the agency to make policy at all. Likewise, the executive usually wields powers other than a simple veto of the agency’s decision, ranging from the ability
to re the agent unilaterally to the responsibility for compiling budget requests.

In this section we examine brie y some alternative versions of the basic
model in which, instead of an ex post veto. the elected authorities wield
more realistic powers over the agency. The main point of this section is that,
in their general shape, the results are not signi cantly different from those
of the basic model. However, we will be able to sketch some of the marginal
dependencies of policy outcomes upon the powers accorded to political ofcials. The powers modeledhere include: legislative budget authority; overriding agency decisions through direct legislation; executive ring; and “independent agencies.”
The Power of the Purse

Suppose now that the legislature, instead of wielding a veto, makes a
budget decision after learning the agency’s intended policy. Let b be the
budget allocated to the agency by the legislature. It isreasonable to suppose
that the extent to which the agency is funded will determinethe effectiveness
of the agency’s policy;given our previous normalization of utility so that “no
action" carries a utility of zero for each player, the impact of budget size
on payoffs can be formalized as follows:
Agent:
ualx, bl b[v, - ix - x,|];
Executive: ttelx, b] = b[v,_. I1 - xl];
Legislature: uglx, b] = b[Vg - ixl].

Inthis setting, the legislature will choose it = 0 ifthe bracketed term in the
de nition of Hg is negative and will make I;as large as possible if the bracketed term is positive. The funds that the legislature is willing to contribute
to the agency are limited by the opportunity costs of not spending that
money on other valued activities. So let us modify the legislature's utility
function as follows:

-

Legislature: uglx, bl b[‘Pg -— Ixl} c{b),
where c is an increasing,convex function with c(0) 0. Now,ifthebracketed
term is positive, the utility-maximizing budget for the legislature sets
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vg—|x|=c’[b},

which occurs at a unique, positive value of :5. Call this value b{x]. For exarnp1e,ifc[b] = b2,thenbixl = [vg — lxI)f2.
In this new version of the game, the executive’s veto decision is made
exactly as before. However, the upper limit imposedon the agent’s decision
by the possible legislative veto is now replaced by a budgetary incentive for
the agent. To see this we rst demonstrate that the legislature always provides a lower budget for less preferred (i.e., higher) values of x. Differentiating the rst-order condition for the legislature’s maximization problem
gives

£[v¢ - Ixl -C’ {bl} =0.
Ifthe agent chooses
x,, < 0),this gives

2:

0 (which makes all three players better off unless

—1=§c'{b}=§5c'tb1§.
db

__

1

-R’ 5"{by
whichis negativeby convexity of c assumed above.Thusthe agent, inchoosing x, must trade off the desirability of being close to x., against the desirability of a higher budget and will choose .1: somewhere between 1:, and the
legislature’s ideal point, 0. Denote the resulting policy choice by
Em].
All these incentives should be anticipated in the appointment stage by
both the executive and legislature. The outcome of that bargainingproblem
will again be the value of x. that maximizes the product

uc[§{x..l. bl lxalll - u.[§lx..l, blélxalll
The outcome will differ from that in the basic model due to the inclusion
of the opportunity cost term clbl in nu and to the shift induced in §[x,] by
budgetary considerations.
An alternative sequence of events is to have the legislative budget decision made before the agency reveals its policy choice. This takes account
of the fact that the legislature may have to commit funds before the agency
actually takes any action. Again, the difference with the basic model's outThe legislature would anticipate the agency’s ulcome would be
timate choice in determining b as well as in the appointment stage. Thus b
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would no longer depend on a particular value of x (once 1:, is established),
and the agency would no longer have to adjust §Lt,] to improve its budget,
so we have x = x, once again. In this formulation the legislature has no ex
_
post sanctions to apply at all.
This “power of the purse” model makes two main points. First, when
we give the legislature a continuous, ex post sanction, such as the amount
of money to appropriate for the agency, the agency hasan incentive to shade
its policy choice towardthe legislature’s idea] point to take advantage of that
inducement.’ Similarly, we could imagine the executive having some sort of
continuous tool, particularly in a repeated game version of the model, in
which the executive might grant or withhold future political cooperation
with the agent to varying degrees. This alters our interpretation of political
control somewhat. Here the legislature is engaged in active, rather than latent, control over the entire range of agency choice because the budgetary
decision is made contingent on the agency’s policy choice.
Second, aside from this matter of interpretation, the model differs little
qualitatively in its outcomes from the basic model. In both, the executive
and legislature bargain over the choice of an agent, attempting to choose
one whose preferences will lead to a policy mutually agreeable to them. In
both, the agent makes the actual choice, in uenced (perhaps subtly) by the
threat or actuality of executive and legislative responses. In both, true
agency discretion consists of the agent’s ability and desire to depart from the
policy expected by the elected authorities.

Executive Firing and Independent Agencies
Some “real world” oversight powers would function in the model precisely like veto power in our basic model. Suppose, for example, that the
executive has the power to re the agent unilaterally in the nal stage of the
game. This works exactly iike the veto power; now, we interpret v,, to be
the value the agent attaches to staying in office, independent of the policy
choice.
Suppose that the executive possesses such power, while the legislature
has no ex post threat at all. Now the agent ignores the basic model’s legislative veto constraint, thatx =5 v,-. Underthe assumption of perfect information, of course, this leaves the nal outcome unaffected: the legislature’s
threat point inthe appointment bargaininggame isstill to holdtheexecutive
to a payoff of zero, which can be accomplished by simply refusing to approve
any appointments. Thus isthe same as before. Ifthere can be any mistake
aboutx,,however,the legislaturemust worry more about the consequences,

x:

’W'hile this is an advantage to the legislature in the policy choice stage, the executive will
take it into account earlier, in the appointment stage. demanding a closer agent ideal point.
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since the seriousness of a mistake is no longer_limited by the legislature’s
ability to zero out the payoffs after the fact. In this case there is no political
control, latent or active, exercised by the legislature.
The opposite model obtains in the case of an independent agency such
as those in the U.S. government. The legislature retains budgetary and authorization control over such an agency, but the executive has, in theory,
no recourse once the appointment is made. Again, the possibility of an error
in the appointment stage is now somewhat more worrisome to theexecutive.
But as long as the appointment results inx, E [1 - v,, Vg], the outcome will
still be exactly as in the basic model. In these one-sided control models, the
elected of cial without ex post controls can compensate for that weakness
through the appointment process.
Direct Legislation
Any power delegated to an agency can always be taken back again. If
some policy is desired, the alternative to leaving the agency’s decision in
place is for the legislature to legislatedirectly, subject to executive approval.
In the terms of the basic model, we could replace the veto power with the
ability of the legislature and executive to override the agency’s decision
through direct legislation. Then the terms v, and V( become the utility attached by those two players to having the agency make the decision for
them, rather than having to do it themselves, possibly with some delay or
likelihood of deadlock.
If this is the only way that the elected authorities can alter an agency
decision, it will be invoked only if it liesoutside the contract curve between
the executive and legislature. Otherwise, one of them is sure to be made
worse off by theresult.If v,, > 1or vg > 1,theboundsmay be even wider,
since some agency actions will not be worth correcting.
The result of direct legislation should be very much like the process of
appointment. Now, only the legislature can propose laws, while the executive can sign or veto them. But again (as in Appendix B), the repeated interaction between the executive and legislature should prevent the legislature from having all the bargaining power, just as it prevents the executive
from having it in the appointment process. Again the NBS provides a reasonable guess about the outcome. Hence, the result of direct legislation
should be precisely
just what the elected authoritiesintended in the first
place. If the payoffs from direct legislation, u.{x.} and ug{x,}, are incorporatedintothe v, and v; terms, the result issimilar to that of the basicmodel.

x;—

Alternative Powers of Political’ Control

After-the-fact controls over agency action inreal governments aresome
complicated combination of the alternatives modeled here. A more realistic
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model incorporating them all would be dif cult to work with; yet from the
results presented here, it is clear that the general outline of our conclusions
from the simple model in the rst section remain in force. Through the ap-

pointment process, the elected authorities play a critical role in determining
the ultimate policy outcome, more so if their guesses about the appointee’s
true preferences are fairly accurate. The threat of ex post action by the
elected authorities provides a measure of latent control over the agent’s actions. The most active oversight and control will be reserved for those instances, rare under conditions of fairly extensive information and morecommon when uncertainty is high, when the agency most surprises its political
masters.

Finally, the executive and the legislature may have different abilities to
affect agency decision making after the delegation and appointment. Our
analysis indicatesthat when members of one branch know that their abilities
to discipline agencies after the fact are weaker than the abilities of the other
branch, they will insist on appointments and procedural features before the
fact that tend to compensate for these differences.

Discussion
The issue of political control of bureaucratic decision making has
spawned a large literature focusing on the question of whether the electoral
constraints faced by politicians extend to the decisionsmade by bureaucrats.
Our model addresses this issue by separating the in uences of elected representatives and bureaucratic decision makers and identifying their distinct
contributions toward policy outcomes. The various modi cations of our basic model indicate that, although stylized, the model captures the essence
of the game that would hold as well in more complex, specialized, and realistic models.
‘The most important result of our analysis isitsdemonstration of the role
of the appointment process in in uencing ultimate policy choices. In applying our model, the “appointment” stage should be taken to include any actions that the executive or legislature can take, prior to agency choice, that
in uence the later goals of the agent or the set of feasible choicesavaiiable
to the agency. Such actions include the structuring of the agency itself, the
denomination of its powers and jurisdiction, the speci cation of administrative procedures to be followed, and the type of personnel with which the
agency is to be staffed (lawyers, economists, engineers, generic civil servants, etc.).

Inprinciple, it does not take a formal analysis such as ours to argue the
signi cance of the appointment stage; however, it is useful to compare the
role of the appointment with the roles of agency choice and executive and
legislative sanctions in a model that includes all those elements together.
Our model emphasizes that the appointment stage (broadly de ned) is the
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primary source of executive and legislative in uence over policy outcomes.
If agency goals are correctly set up in the rst place, then the agency carries
out the policies that the executive and legislature would have agreed upon,
had they spent the time and effort necessary to do so. Only if there is slippage at the appointment stage do either agency discretion or after-the-fact
political control take on any importance. And the better the information at
the appointment stage, the smaller the roles of those later steps in determining policy outcomes. On the other hand, if there are any costs to exercising
political control (in our model, the loss of v, and vg) then neither latent nor
active political control can fully make up for mistakes at the appointment
stage.

Our analysis alsomakes an importantpoint about agency discretion. An
agency may set policy without direct interference from the legislature or
from higher executive authorities. Inour scheme, though,this does not constitute agency discretion. Rather, agency discretion occurs when the agency
succeeds in choosing a policy in line with agency goals, when those goals differ from what the executive and legislature expected at the appointment
stage. Usingthis de nition leads us to assign agency discretion a smaller role
in determining policy than would a more naive approach, based solely on
the observation of what the agency does and how the elective branches react. This distinction clari es the conditions under which patterns of policymaking can be changed by restricting agency discretion through improvements in executive and legislative oversight capabilities.
Two kinds of political control gure importantly in our model. Active
control occurs when the agent’s ideal is far enough out of line with the tolerance of either the executive or the legislature that exercising ex post sanctions becomes worthwhile. Latent contzrol occurs when the agent chooses a
policy other than its ideal in order to avoid such sanctions. Depending on
the values of the parameters v,,, v,, and V; in our model, the relative sizes
of the ranges in which these types of control occur may differ. Ceteris paribus, the better the information available to the elected authorities at appointment time, the less often will active control be exercised. When the
agent places a high value on avoiding sanctions (such as the veto), the range
for latent oversight is relatively large. Latent oversight is, by de nition,
never observed; but its role in implementing political control over the
agency is inprinciple just as important as that of activecontrol. Finally, continuous controls, such as budgeting power, may have aspects of both active
and latent control. Depending on the agent's choice, a budgetary reaction
may be subtle, even unobservable; but the anticipation of a stronger reaction keeps the agent from straying further.
The game among agency decision makers and their elected overseers
is complex, and we have captured only certain aspects of this complexity in
presenting a general model of bargaining over appointment and policy
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choice. In doing so, we have left aside many other possible sources of political control and agency discretion.These more complicated features of the
problem, however, can be fruitfully studied by expanding on our basic
model. Though it is unlikely that more “realistic” assumptions will change
our general conclusions, the results of such studies of particular institutional
features and policy situations would surely prove illuminating.
Our view of the policymaking process has several implications for the
conduct of research on policymalting and for the design of reforms of the
process. The most basic reflects our design of the model: researchers and
reformers should be careful not to fall into the trap of studying the agency
in isolation and of seeing as peripheral any executive and legislative actors
who do not engage in the day-to-day formulation of policy details!The analyst of agency policymaking must ask why the agency has the particular
structure, procedures, jurisdiction, and personnel that it does; why particular leaders are in of ce at any given time; andwhat unspoken expectations
agency personnel might have about the conditionsunder whichtheir elected
overseers might invoke sanctions.9
Such an approach requires the analyst rst to identify the relevant actors
within the legislative and executive organizations that our model treats as
individual players: a particular White House adviser, for example, or therelevant subcommittees in each house of Congress may conduct most of the
signi cant bargaining and oversight regarding a given agency. The next step
is to identify their political goals. This is best done through the analysis of
previous policy positions and constituency interests, rather than of the
often-empty rhetoric of speeches and the preambles of bills.
Finally, the analyst must ascertain the quality and content of the information available to elected of cials. The nature of the policy area is one indicator of the kind of uncertainty involved: in a eid with rapid technical
and tactical innovation, politically desirable policies will be more difficult
to forecast than in, say, case-by-case regulation of a stable and wellunderstood market. On the other hand, McCubbins and Schwartz (1984)
point out the ease with which policy details and their defects and possible
remedies can be reported to legislators by lobbyists for aggrieved interest
groups. Aberbach (1987) demonstratesthat legislators and their staffs commonly go beyond such “ re-alarm oversight,” acquiring extensive information about the arcana of policy decisions within their committee jurisdictions. These ndings contrast with the common viewpoint that legislators
‘Compare the studies in the volume edited by Wilson (1980), most of which view such an
approach as a virtue.
’Good examples of such an approach are the studies by Cary (1961) and Krasnow. Longlcy, and Terry (1982).
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are generally not suf ciently informed of policy details to perform
meaningful oversight.”
These same lessons also apply to policy reformers, who often recommend structural or procedural changes in order to change outcomes. A few
years ago, this approach led to calls for changes inthe commission structure
of regulatory agencies, sunset laws, sunshine laws, regulatory budgets, and
all manner of other alterations in the organization of agencies and the process of agency decision making and oversight. In many cases the solutions
proposed failed to take notice of the real sources of policy and were ineffective or even counterproductive (Noll,1971; Calvert and Weingast, 1982).
For example, sunset provisions for mandatory review and reevaluation of
agencies are unlikely to have much effect if legislative control is already exercised through the mechanisms of our model. Moving an agency into or out
of a cabinet department is unlikely to have much effect on its policies unless
it falls under the jurisdiction of a different congressional committee or
comes under altered presidential control (as when the president gains the
authority to re the head of a previously independent agency).
Application of the principles for policy research derived from our the-

oretical model could thus help policy reformers understand how better to
achieve their goals. In some cases policy change is best pursued through
structural change in the legislature, such as a change in committee jurisdictions. Inother cases only political activity to gain electoral relevance to politicians is likely to bring about change. An inappropriate xation on the actual locus of decision making, the agency, may lead reformers astray and
bring meager or unintended results.
Insum, our model of the policy process clari es the general relationship
between policymal-ting agencies and the elected representatives who create
them. For purposes of policy analysis and reform, it emphasizes the indirect
and, in real life, subtle effect of the wishes of elected politicians upon the
actions of unelected bureaucrats. It presents a formal de nition of agency
discretion, distinguishing it from the act of decision making and from the
bargains struck among elected of cials. These results imply a set of principles that ought to guide students of agency decision processes in assessing
the effective source of policy and to demonstrate that policymakingactivity
is distinct from policy creation.
Finally, our analysis of the structure of the game implicit in the constitutional processes of policymaking offers theoretical insights into the role
“As cited in the introductory section. Incidentally,analysts ought not to fall intothe trap
of supposing that legislators are irrelevant to oversight and information-gathering processes
just because most of thework is performed bytheir staffs. For reasonsrnade clearlrysalisbury
and Shepsle (1981), both committee and personal staff members in the us. Congress act as
effective extensions of their bosses. Thus from the standpoint of legislative oversight capabilities. information in the hands of sta ers is information in the hands of members.
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of bureaucratic decisions in a democratic system. The process of policymaking that we model, most clearly descriptive of the U.S. federal government,
contains a system of checksthat constrainthe choices of bureaucrats. Under
favorable conditions it creates an incentive structure that leads bureaucrats
to choose policies re ecting the desires of elected politicians.
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APPENDIX A
Repeated Game Version otthe Basic Model
Suppose that the basic game is played in nitely many times in succession, with all players
learning the outcome of the previous play before proceeding to the next. Future payoffs
are
discounted by multiplication by a discount factor IS. A player's total payo f for the repeated
game is the sum of these discounted payoffs over all plays. This method of repetition
is the
same as employed by Axelrod (1981).
To keep this relatively brief. we restrict our attention to the case where x, is in the interval
[0, 1]. Also. we require it, and u; to be continuous and single peaked, and u,(O) and ug(1) to
be nonpositive. We add one additional assumption below.
De ne the following values:
2, =

minl-t|u.[xl

3?

0};

= maxlze. min [x|u.l.tl > 01};
z: = maxlxltulxl 3* 0};

y.

J’: =

mi izrum illl alxl

3’

0]}-

Our nal assumption is that y, as y(. Inwords, y, isthe smallest value of such that both the
agent and the executive receive nonnegative payoffs, while y; is the largest value such that
the
agent and the legislature bothreceive nonnegative payoffs. Due to our previous assumptions,
note that 2,, y.. 2:, and y; are always in [0, 1]. and that x. E [y,. yd. Now the following result
holds:

Paorosrtron: Let x' be any point in [y,, y]. Then. for su iciently large 8, there is a
subgarne-perfect equilibrium in the repeated game such that, along the equilibrium path,
it’ is proposed and accepted inevery play of the constituent game. For values of x’ other
than those in [_v,, }'¢]. there is no such equilibrium for any 5
1.
A proof will be furnished by the authors on request.
The equilibria in which the same policy is proposed and accepted on each play are simple
andattractive ones. Antongthosmonein particular standsoutasafocal point (Schel ng. 1960).
The agent's best if is .r,. Furtherntore, the executive and legislature have just agreed on at.

through the appointment process. Since under the assumptions here .r,is always available as
an equilibrium outcome, it is the one we would expect the players to choose unanimously in
playing this nortoooperative game.

APPENDIXB
Cooperadveversus uaconpeu-atlve argalnlngllodels
We have suggested the Nash bargaining model to describe the result of negotiations between the legislature and the executive, but the use of that cooperative-game model in an oth-
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er-wise noncooperative-garne context requires some justi cation. A natural noncooperative
model for this procedure would be the following: the executive nominates a candidate, and the
legislature may accept or reject that nomination. Incase of rejection. the process begins again.
with both elected officials losing some utility due to the delay. The unique subgarne-perfect
equilibrium to such a process is that the executive rst nominates an agent with x, = v,, and
the legislature accepts (proof available on request). Inother words, the executive gets its most
preferred outcome subject to avoiding a veto by the legislature. One could follow through this
reasoning in an obvious manner to derive conclusions similar to those in the text.
However. this bargaining model leaves out an important consideration. Executives and
legislatures deal with one another in a series of appointment cases (as well as other matters).
Each of these cases is something like the ncncooperative bargaining game described above.
In general, we could describe this repeated bargaining game as follows. First. the executive
nominates a candidate; then the legislature may either accept or reject that candidate. If the
legislature accepts. both players receivethe corresponding payoff; andif the legislaturerejects,
both receive zero. Then. whether the nontiriotion was approved or not, the players proceed to
the next appointment (to the same or another office). Overall payoffs are a discounted sum
of the case-by-case payoffs. Of course, the game could be complicated by varying the payoffs
from one of ce to the next, but as long as the players have common expectations about those
future stakes, this would make no important difference in their overall behavior.
Set up in this way, the repeatednomination process is a garden-variety repeatedgame with
discounting. As such, it is subject to the Folk Theorem (see Fudenberg and Maskin. 1986):
any combination of average payoffs that gives each player more than itsminimax payoff can
be sustained as a subgarne-perfect equilibrium in the repeated game, provided that the discounting is not too heavy. This means that any series of appointments of agents. each of whose
ideal points lies inside the range [1 v,, vg]. could occur in equilibriurn. given the appropriate
pattern of expectations and retaliation by the players (proof available upon request).
Although we have no noncooperative—garne criterion for deciding which of the in nity of
equilibria the players in this appointment game might settle on, intuitiontells us that the results
are likely to be appointments somewhere in the ‘‘middle‘‘ of the no-veto interval. One appealing objective criterion for identifyingsuch points isthe Nash bargainingsolution (NBS) (Nash,
1950). Here we take the view that the axioms de ning the NBS are criteriafor a goodprediction
technique for bargainingoutcomes, ratherthan criteria for a “fair arbitration scheme,” as they
are sometimes presented (e.g.. Luce and Raiffa, 1957). For present purposes the particular
choice of a bargaining prediction methodis inconsequential provided that it is centrally located
and responds to the relative bargaining positions of the players.

—
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